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I. INTRODUCTION
The telecommunications industry and the data processing industry
have become integral parts of the world economy. Furthermore, over the
years, these services have come to complement each other. The result
has been the development of services which are made up of both commu-
nications and data processing components. For example, the LEXIS and
Westlaw services enable lawyers to use the telecommunications network
to interact with information stored in computer memories. Automatic
teller machines also provide a combination of communications and data
processing services. Other examples are mass calling services where
computers are programmed to call several telephone numbers and play a
recorded message, and electronic mail services, such as AT&T's "Cus-
tom Calling II" service, which enable people to store messages that
others can pick up by phone later.
The Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") refers to these
services as "enhanced services." An enhanced service allows information
to be sent through the telecommunications network from one kind of
computer to another, or it enables people to interact with information
stored in a computer at another location by means of the telecommunica-
tions network. Essentially, an enhanced service is a computer processing
function which can be performed anywhere in the telecommunications
network rather than at the site of a centrally located mainframe
computer.'
Telecommunications common carriers often are able to take advan-
tage of significant "economies of scope" in offering enhanced services.
"Economies of scope" refers to the efficiencies gained by one common
1 The FCC defines enhanced services as services "which employ computer processing applica-
tions that act on the format, content, code, protocol, or similar aspects of the subscriber's transmit-
ted information; provide the subscriber additional, different, or restructured information; or involve
subscriber interaction with stored information." 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a)(1986).
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carrier offering both enhanced services and basic telephone services
rather than two common carriers providing these services separately.
Therefore, the consumer benefits, since telecommunications companies
can offer both basic and enhanced services at a lower cost. Market forces
adequately regulate the enhanced services industry.2 The telecommuni-
cations industry, however, is not adequately regulated by market forces,
and so it must be regulated by a government agency.3 Where a company
is allowed to engage in both regulated and unregulated businesses, con-
sumers can be harmed.
Consumer harm occurs under either United States regulation or
Western European regulation, because consumers become the victims of
predatory pricing, and bear the increased costs of the telecommunica-
tions industry. The most common method of telecommunications regu-
lation in the United States is the "rate of return" method.4 Under this
method, the carrier may charge rates high enough to allow the carrier to
cover its costs, and to receive a fair rate of return on its capital. This
"cost plus" system encourages the carrier to conduct its business so that
its costs are higher than they would be otherwise. As a result, the com-
mon carrier participating in both regulated and unregulated markets can
manipulate its accounting records so that costs the carrier incurred in its
unregulated business will appear as though they were incurred in the
carrier's regulated business. This is called "cross-subsidization." The
practice of cross-subsidization increases the prices the captive telecom-
munications consumer must pay. In addition, it allows the carrier to
engage in predatory pricing to the detriment of competitors in the en-
hanced services market.5 In Western Europe, most telecommunications
services are government-owned monopolies. Government-owned carri-
ers also engage in predatory pricing in order to keep foreign enhanced
service providers out of their markets.6
Furthermore, allowing some common carriers with monopoly
power in telecommunications services to participate also in enhanced
2 See Computer I, Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d 291, 298 (1970); Green Paper on the Develop-
ment of the Common Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment, COM(87)290 final
(Brussels, June 30, 1987)[hereinafter Green Paper].
3 W. BAUMOL & A. BLINDER, ECONOMICS; PRINCIPLES AND POLICY, 497, 808 (1982).
4 For a good description of rate of return regulation, see L. SCHWARTZ, J. FLYNN, & H. FIRST,
FREE ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION: GOVERNMENT REGULATION, 409-17 (6th ed.
1985).
5 A carrier engages in predatory pricing when it sets its prices below its costs in an attempt to
drive other carriers out of the market. If this attempt is successful, this carrier will be left with a
monopoly, and will be able to charge monopoly prices. This will allow the carrier to recoup the
losses it incurred during the period when it engaged in predatory pricing.
6 Green Paper, supra note 2, at 77.
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services permits those carriers to abuse that power, and the problem of
cross-subsidization arises. In the United States and in Western Europe,
usually one common carrier opeiates the telecommunications network in
a given area. This carrier controls the equipment which other carriers
use to offer enhanced services to consumers in that area. In other words,
one carrier has control of "bottleneck" facilities. If this carrier is allowed
to provide enhanced services to consumers, then it will have an incentive
to use its bottleneck facilities to exclude other enhanced service providers
from the market. The exclusion of other enhanced services providers in-
creases the monopoly power of the carrier with control of the bottleneck
facilities, and exacerbates the problems of predatory pricing.
For the past twenty years, the FCC has struggled to develop rules
that will allow common carriers in the United States to take advantage of
their economies of scope while preventing or minimizing the pernicious
effects of cross-subsidization and bottlenecks.7 As a result, complicated
rules, and definitions attempting to draw a line between basic and en-
hanced services have evolved. In addition, the operators of bottleneck
facilities have been prohibited from offering many enhanced services.
More recently, the Commission of the European Economic Commu-
nity ("EEC") has published the Green Paper on Telecommunications,'
which proposes rules in this area, and attempts to integrate the EEC's
enhanced services and data processing markets across its Member States'
national boundaries. One of the effects of the Green Paper probably will
be that the Member States will base their definitions of basic and en-
hanced services on characteristics of the markets for those services, such
as the level of demand for the service and the availability of economies of
scale and scope, rather than the FCC method of basing the definitions on
characteristics of the services themselves, such as how much the services
alter the form or content of the consumer's information. The other effect
of the Green Paper probably will be that the operators of bottleneck facil-
ities will be allowed to offer most enhanced services.
Section II of this comment will summarize the FCC rules. Section
III will summarize the Green Paper, and Section IV will describe tele-
communications regulation in the EEC in general. Section V will com-
pare the FCC rules with the proposed Common Market rules to
determine which rules strike the most appropriate balance between pro-
moting common carrier participation in the enhanced services market
7 Computer i, Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 291.
8 Green Paper, supra note 2. In this paper, the Commission of the European Communities will
be referred to as the "EEC" in order to avoid confusion with the Federal Communications
Commission.
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and protecting telecommunications consumers and enhanced services
competitors. Section VI will conclude that the FCC was mistaken in
finding that its policy goal of reducing regulatory uncertainty would be
more difficult to achieve under the EEC method of distinguishing be-
tween basic and enhanced services. It will also conclude that the EEC
was mistaken in finding that its policy goal of integrating the European
telecommunications system across national boundaries would be more
difficult to achieve if enhanced services providers are required to divest
control of bottleneck facilities, as is done in the United States.
II. DESCRIPTION OF FCC RULES
The rules governing the provision of enhanced services and cus-
tomer premises equipment ("CPE") in the United States have evolved
over several years. They moved from rigidly separating the provision of
basic services from that of enhanced services to almost completely re-
laxing the separation. Throughout this evolution, however, the owners
of bottleneck facilities have been severely limited in the enhanced services
they are allowed to provide.
A. Early Attempts at Preventing Cross-Subsidization
The first step in this evolution was the 1956 Consent Decree,9 which
resulted from an antitrust suit brought by the Justice Department of the
United States in 1949.10 The Justice Department alleged that the Ameri-
can Telephone and Telegraph Company ("AT&T") used its control of
bottleneck facilities to keep other companies out of the telephone equip-
ment manufacturing market in violation of the Sherman Act."1 The Jus-
tice Department wanted AT&T to divest its stock ownership of its
manufacturing subsidiary, Western Electric, in order to separate tele-
phone manufacturing from the provision of telephone service. The De-
fense Department was worried that this divestiture would eliminate
Western Electric's ability to conduct research, since Western Electric's
research had led to many discoveries with defense applications in the
years prior to the Consent Decree. 2 The result was a compromise be-
tween the Justice Department and the Defense Department. Under the
9 United States v. Western Electric, 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,246 (D.N.J. Jan. 24,
1956)[hereinafter 1956 Consent Decree or Consent Decree].
10 Id. at 71,136.
11 Id. at 71,143. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). See also United States v. AT&T, 552 F.
Supp. 131, 135 (D.D.C. 1982); aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983)[here-
inafter Modified Final Judgment or MFJ].
12 See MFJ, 552 F. Supp. at 135-38 (description of the Defense Department's efforts on behalf of
and in collusion with AT&T).
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Consent Decree, Western Electric and AT&T were left together, but
Western Electric was limited to manufacturing equipment for the Bell
System,13 and AT&T was limited to providing common carrier commu-
nication services and "businesses or services incidental to the furnishing
of" these services. 4 AT&T also was required to make patents available
to all parties who asked for them and who were willing to pay reasonable
royalties.' 5 The order requiring AT&T to share patents with other com-
panies was supposed to enable these other companies to compete with
AT&T in the equipment market.
After the Consent Decree, little happened in this area until the FCC
started to promulgate rules in 1970. In that year, the FCC published the
First Computer Inquiry, otherwise known as Computer 1.16 Computer I
was the FCC's first attempt to develop rules that would allow common
carriers to participate in the enhanced services and CPE markets, and
that would prevent cross-subsidization and predatory pricing. The FCC
promulgated Computer I because advances in computer technology
made it necessary to address the regulatory treatment of enhanced serv-
ices and CPE.
17
In Computer I, the Commission developed the "Maximum Separa-
tion" policy, and held that all common carriers could offer enhanced
services if the services were offered under this policy.'" The Maximum
Separation policy required carriers which offered enhanced services to do
so through a separate subsidiary. The subsidiary was required to have
separate officers and operating personnel, to maintain separate equip-
ment and facilities devoted exclusively to the provision of noncarrier
services, and to file separate books of account with the FCC.19 Relations
between carriers and their separate subsidiaries were heavily regulated.
All arrangements between the carrier and its subsidiary were to be filed
with the FCC, and neither the carrier nor the subsidiary were allowed to
do any advertising on behalf of the other.2" In addition, carriers and
their affiliates were required to charge the same prices in transactions
13 1956 Consent Decree, 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,246 at 71,137-38.
14 Id. at 71,138.
15 Id.
16 Regulatory & Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer & Communi-
cations Services & Facilities, Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d 291(1970)[hereinafter Computer I,
Tentative Decision], modified in Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d 267(1971)[hereinafter Computer I, Final
Decision], aff'd in part sub nom. GTE Service Corp v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724 (2nd Cir. 1973). This
proceeding was actually initiated in 1966. Computer I, Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 291.
17 Computer I, Tentative Decision at 291.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 302-04.
20 Id. at 303.
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with each other as they would in transactions with any other entity.21
The Commission found that the Maximum Separation policy did not ap-
ply to AT&T because, under the limitations placed on it in the 1956
Consent Decree, AT&T was not allowed to offer any enhanced
22services.
The Commission assumed that these restrictions and the competi-
tion among carriers to attract more consumers would be enough to pre-
vent carriers from discriminating against non-affiliated enhanced service
providers.23 The Commission concluded, "[w]e expect that under no cir-
cumstances will carriers give any preferential treatment to their data
processing affiliates and that carriers will scrupulously administer the
terms and conditions of tariffs in making their facilities and services
available to affiliates and non-affiliates on a non-discriminatory and non-
preferential basis."2 However, if the Commission's assumption turned
out to be wrong, and competitive pressure did not force carriers to make
their networks accessible to as many enhanced service providers as possi-
ble, the Commission promised to establish rules to rectify this problem. 25
In summary, by 1970 most carriers could offer enhanced services if
they complied with the Maximum Separation policy announced in Com-
puter I, but AT&T was prohibited from offering enhanced services by the
1956 Consent Decree.
B. Relaxation of Rules Governing AT&T
The level of technology at the time of Computer I required that all
data processing services be performed by a centrally located mainframe
computer.26 The development of terminals with data processing capabil-
ities during the 1970s made much of Computer I obsolete, and forced the
Commission to promulgate new rules and definitions in Computer II in
1980.27
21 Id.
22 Id. The Tentative Decision was reaffirmed in Computer 1, Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d 267
(1971). In the Final Decision the FCC created more rules to govern the carrier-subsidiary
relationship:
a. The carrier may not dispose of excess computer capacity on the open market,
b. The carrier may not obtain data processing services from its subsidiary, and
c. The subsidiary may not make any use of its parent carrier's logo.
Id. at 275.
23 Computer I, Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 304.
24 Computer 1, Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 283.
25 Computer 1, Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 303.
26 Computer 1, Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 283.
27 Second Computer Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 391 (1980); modified on reconsideration, 84




Under Computer 11, the Maximum Separation policy developed in
Computer I remained essentially the same. However, in addition to the
restrictions promulgated in Computer I, the subsidiary was required to
keep its own books of account and to have separate officers. z8 The sub-
sidiary was also required to employ separate operating, marketing, instal-
lation, and maintenance personnel, and to use separate computer
facilities in the provision of enhanced services.2 9 The parent and subsidi-
ary could not share computer capacity and could not develop software
jointly.30 Some transfers of information between the parent and the sub-
sidiary were to be filed with the FCC.3 1 In addition, the subsidiary was
not allowed to construct, own, or operate its own transmission facili-
ties.32 However, the parent and subsidiary would be allowed to share
some administrative expenses, such as legal fees.33
The most significant change in Computer I1 was that it further lim-
ited the number of carriers who had to comply with the Maximum Sepa-
ration policy.34 In justifying this change, the Commission noted that
maximum separation forced some inefficient and costly duplication of
capital expenditures. The FCC was concerned that this inefficiency
would result in undesirable and unnecessary increases in consumer
prices, and that the increased capital costs might be large enough to keep
small carriers out of the market.35 Since the main benefit of separation
results from the prevention of cross-subsidization and predatory pricing,
the Commission reasoned that the Maximum Separation policy should
be applied only to those carriers with enough market power to engage in
cross-subsidization and predatory pricing.36 The Commission concluded
that the only carrier with this market power was AT&T,37 and that by
forbidding AT&T's subsidiary from owning transmission facilities, it was
Computer and Communication Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied 461
U.S. 938 (1983)[hereinafter Computer I1].
28 Id. at 391.
29 Id. at 486.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 474.
33 Id. at 486.
34 Under Computer I, the Maximum Separation policy was only applied to carriers with annual
revenues over $1,000,000. Computer I, Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 302-03.
35 Computer II, 77 F.C.C.2d at 466. AT&T argued that another cost of separation was a de-
creased level of innovation. The Commission doubted that there was a causal connection between
size and innovation. Id. at 464-65.
36 Id. at 463.
37 Id. at 474. Originally, the Commission applied Maximum Separation to GTE, but removed it
in a later proceeding. See Reconsideration Order, 84 F.C.C.2d 50, 72 (1980).
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adequately ensuring equal access to all enhanced service providers.38
Of course, by applying the Maximum Separation policy to AT&T,
the Commission allowed AT&T to enter the enhanced services market
for the first time and arguably contradicted the 1956 Consent Decree.
The FCC resolved this apparent contradiction by interpreting section
V(g) of the Consent Decree, which allowed AT&T to participate in
"businesses or services incidental to" common carrier services, as al-
lowing the provision of enhanced services.3 9
This interpretation of section V(g) infuriated the Justice Depart-
ment, since, historically, the Consent Decree was always interpreted to
limit AT&T to the provision of services the charges for which are subject
to public regulation.' The Justice Department also said that since the
District Court retained jurisdiction for purposes of construing the Con-
sent Decree,41 the FCC did not have the authority to interpret section
V(g).42 As a result, the Justice Department said it would ignore the
FCC's interpretation.43 The FCC contended that, absent a definitive rul-
ing by the Judgment Court, it was free to interpret the Consent Decree in
any way necessary to fulfill its responsibilities under the Communications
Act of 1934."
Two years later, Judge Harold H. Greene of the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia resolved the dispute. At that
time, Judge Greene was presiding over another antitrust suit by the Jus-
tice Department against AT&T. The Justice Department filed this suit
in 1974, because it felt that the 1956 Consent Decree was not able to
prevent AT&T from unreasonably restraining competition in the equip-
ment market or in the long distance service market.45 AT&T fought this
suit for eight years. However, because of the uncertainty in regulatory
structure resulting from Computer 1146 and the proposal of two bills in
Congress that could have amended the Communications Act,47 AT&T
38 Computer I, 77 F.C.C.2d at 474 Consent Decree, 1956 Trade Cas. (CCHI) 68, 246 at 71,138.
39 Computer II, 77 F.C.C.2d at 490.
40 Id. at 491.
41 Consent Decree, 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,246 at 71,143.
42 Computer II, 77 F.C.C.2d at 491.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 492. See also 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
45 MFJ, 552 F. Supp. at 139 n.18.
46 The Computer and Communications Industry Association had appealed Computer II to the
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, and after the New Jersey District Court affirmed the FCC's
construction of the 1956 Consent Decree, the Justice Department appealed that decision to the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Both cases were pending at the time of the MFJ. See MFJ,
552 F. Supp. at 138 n.17.
47 S. 898, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 5158, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
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agreed to a settlement which became known as the Modified Final Judg-
ment (,,9 J,).
48
Stripped down to its basic components, the MFJ was an arrange-
ment in which AT&T agreed to divest itself of the local Bell Operating
Companies ("BOCs") in exchange for having the 1956 Consent Decree
overturned, leaving it free to compete in any industry.4 9 The only restric-
tions placed on it were that it was not allowed to reacquire the BOCs,50
and it was prohibited from entering the electronic publishing market for
seven years.5'
The restrictions placed on the BOCs were far greater than those
placed on AT&T. The BOCs were not allowed to enter the long distance
service market, or the "information service" market. Nor were they per-
mitted to manufacture CPE.52 "Information services" were defined as
"the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transform-
ing, processing, retrieving, utilizing or making available information
which may be conveyed via telecommunication."53 These restrictions
were imposed because under the MFJ the BOCs maintained control of
the bottleneck facilities. To have allowed the BOCs to participate in
these restricted markets would have enabled them to limit their competi-
tors' access to consumers.54 The Court also demanded that the BOCs
phase in new interconnection equipment so that competitors would even-
tually be assured access to consumers equal to that of AT&T.55
C. Relaxation of Rules Governing Bottleneck Facilities
The result of the MFJ was that the control of the bottleneck facili-
ties was taken away from AT&T and given to the BOCs. Since one of
the reasons the Computer II rules were placed on AT&T was to limit its
48 MFJ, 552 F. Supp. at 131. See generally Hillman, Telecommunications Deregulation: The
Martyrdom of the Regulated Monopolist, 79 Nw. U.L. REv. 1183 (1985).
49 MFJ, 552 F. Supp. at 170.
50 Id. at 170 n.166.
51 Id. at 185-86. Electronic publishing was defined as:
the provision of any information which a provider or publisher has, or has caused to be
originated, authored, compiled, collected, or edited, or in which he has a direct or indirect
financial or proprietary interest, and which is disseminated to an unaffiliated person through
some electronic means.
Id. at 181.
52 Id. at 188-91. The MFJ restriction against manufacturing CPE does not prohibit the BOCs
from buying and reselling CPE. Id. at 191-93. Nor does the MFJ restrict the BOCs in foreign
ventures. Southwestern Bell owns 50% of an electronic publishing company in Israel. Hudson,
Baby Bells Pushing to Expand Overseas, but Face Obstacles Abroad and at Home, Wall St. J., Oct. 26,
1987, at 12, col. 2.
53 MFJ, 552 F. Supp. at 179.
54 Id. at 188-89.
55 Id. at 195-96.
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ability to abuse its control of its bottleneck facilities, 6 it would have
made sense to apply the Computer II rules to the BOCs to prevent them
from abusing their control of bottleneck facilities. In fact, one probably
would have assumed that the "information services" restriction placed
on the BOCs in the MFJ would forbid them from offering enhanced serv-
ices, since Judge Greene said that enhanced services and information
services were "essentially equivalent."57 However, shortly after the
MFJ, the FCC noted the differences in the definitions of "enhanced serv-
ices" and "information services", 58 and decided that, given this ambigu-
ity, the BOCs could offer some enhanced services. 9 The Commission
went on to establish structural separation rules for the BOCs similar to,
but less restrictive than, the Computer II rules. The BOCs and their sep-
arate subsidiaries were allowed to share billing costs and marketing costs
in addition to the shared costs allowed AT&T in Computer I."
The FCC relaxed the Computer II rules as they applied to the BOCs
in the area of protocol conversion as well. 6 In the Asynchronous/X.25
Protocol Conversion Waiver,62 the Commission waived the requirement
that the BOCs and their separate subsidiaries maintain separate equip-
ment and facilities in the provision of protocol conversion services. 3
This separate facilities requirement was waived because the FCC realized
that prohibiting the BOCs from relocating their protocol conversion
services made many other computer processing services more expensive
for consumers without any improvement in quality of service.' How-
ever, the waivers were made dependent on the BOCs satisfying certain
conditions designed to prevent them from cross-subsidization and preda-
tory pricing.65 The first condition was that the BOCs must give equal
treatment to the interoffice communications channels supporting their
56 Computer II, 77 F.C.C.2d at 462.
57 MFJ, 552 F. Supp. at 178 n.198.
58 See supra notes I and 53 and accompanying text.
59 BOC Structural Separation Order, 95 F.C.C.2d 1117, 1127 (1983).
60 Id. at 1140-43.
61 Protocol conversion allows consumers to use "packet switched" networks instead of "circuit
switched" networks. Packet switched networks break a consumer's message into discrete units, or
"packets", and send each packet to its destination along any network route that is not being used for
another message. Circuit switched networks route a consumer's message once, then keep that route
open for that consumer whether or not he is sending any information. Therefore, packet switched
networks are more convenient for computer processing consumers, because the packet switched net-
works do not require that the consumer "tie up the line" for the entire time that he is using the
computer service.
62 100 F.C.C.2d 1057 (1985).
63 Computer I, Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 303.
64 Asynchronous/X.25 Protocol Conversion Waiver, 100 F.C.C.2d at 1059-60.




packet switching services involving asynchronous/X.25 protocol conver-
sion and the channels used by others.66 Secondly, the BOCs must price
their protocol conversion services separately from their basic services.6 7
Finally, consumers using other enhanced services that require packet
switching must have equal access to the BOCs' and others' protocol con-
version services.68 The FCC required the BOCs to file proof that they
would be able to meet these conditions before it would grant the
waiver.69
Soon after the Computer 11 separation rules were applied to the
BOCs, the FCC published the Computer III Notice,70 which announced
the Commission's intention to revise or eliminate the Computer II rules
for services while keeping the rules for CPE intact. The Commission
proposed several regulatory frameworks to replace Computer II, and
asked for comments from the general public regarding these proposals.71
The Commission stated that Computer I needed to be revised, because
the MFJ made much of Computer 11 obsolete,72 and because the Com-
puter 11 definition of "enhanced service" had become ambiguous due to
advancements in technology.73 In addition, because the waiver process
in the Asynchronous/X.25 Protocol Conversion Waiver was used for other
types of protocol conversion,74 an ad hoe, case-by-case regulatory ap-
proach resulted which gave rise to regulatory uncertainty. 75
The most interesting proposal the Commission made in the Com-
puter III Notice was the proposal it made in Part II of the Notice.76 The
Part II Proposal was a three-pronged test to determine whether a service
should be regulated. If a carrier wanted to offer a basic service, then the
FCC would regulate that service directly.77 If a carrier wanted to offer a
non-communications service,71 then that service would be completely un-
regulated.79 Finally, if a carrier wanted to offer a service "ancillary to
66 Id. at 1099-1100.
67 Id. at 1100.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 1104.
70 Third Computer Inquiry, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 50 Fed. Reg. 33,581 (Aug. 16,
1985)[hereinafter Computer II Notice].
71 Id. at 33,605.
72 Id. at 33,584.
73 Id. at 33,583.
74 Protocols Decision, 95 F.C.C.2d 584 (1983).
75 Computer II Notice, 50 Fed. Reg. at 33,582.
76 Id. at 33,589-91.
77 Id. at 33,589.
78 Id. at 33,587.
79 Id. at 33,590.
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communications," such as enhanced services or CPE, ° then the Com-
mission would examine the structure of the market for that service. If
that service could be provided with unlimited economies of scale and/or
scope, so that one could not expect to have multiple vendors of the ser-
vice, then the Commission would regulate the service.81 On the other
hand, if a carrier wanted to offer an ancillary service with limited econo-
mies of scale and scope, then the question of whether or not to regulate
would turn on whether or not the carrier was "dominant," or had con-
trol of bottleneck facilities. If the carrier was not dominant, or did not
control bottlenecks, then the service should be treated like a non-commu-
nications service.82 If the carrier was dominant or did control bottle-
necks, then some sort of separation would be appropriate to prevent anti-
competitive conduct.8 3
The Part II Proposal was never implemented. The Commission
agreed with the commentators who said it would be too difficult to estab-
lish unambiguous definitions of such terms as "market power, .... compe-
tition," "bottleneck," and "dominant carrier."84  The Commission
described its new regulatory framework in the Computer III Order.85
The order allowed AT&T and the BOCs to provide enhanced services on
an unseparated basis if they filed a Joint Cost Allocation plan,86 and de-
veloped what the Commission called "Comparably Efficient Interconnec-
tion" ("CEI"). Eventually, the Commission expected CEI to lead to
"Open Network Architecture" ("ONA"). Unless AT&T and the BOCs
developed CEI/ONA, the Commission would continue to enforce the
Computer 11 separation rules.87
The Joint Cost Allocation plan in Computer III was intended as an
interim measure until the Joint Cost Order was issued.88 The Joint Cost
Order89 replaced the separate books requirement of Computer II for cap-
80 Id. at 33,587.
81 Id. at 33,589.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 33,589-90.
84 Third Computer Inquiry, Report and Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 958, 1015, 1017 (1986)[hereinafter
Computer III Order].
85 104 F.C.C.2d 958.
86 Id. at 1070.
87 Id. at 1020.
88 See id. at 1069. The interim Joint Cost Allocation rules were taken from In re Separation of
Costs of Regulated Telephone Service From Costs on Nonregulated Activities, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 104 F.C.C.2d 59 (1986).
89 In re Separation of Costs of Regulated Telephone Service from Costs of Nonregulated Activi-
ties, Report and Order, 2 F.C.C. Rd. 1298, 62 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 163 (Feb. 6, 1987)[hereinafter
Separation of Costs, Report and Order].
Telecommunications Regulation
9:415(1988)
ital depreciation costs,90 and was expected to expose cross-subsidiza-
tion. 91 Instead of forcing carriers to attribute all depreciation costs to the
regulated business, the Joint Cost Order allowed carriers to attribute a
percentage of the costs to both the regulated and the unregulated busi-
nesses. The percentages would be equal to the relative demand for the
regulated and unregulated services when total demand was at its peak. 92
Dominant carriers were also required to undergo independent audits.9 3
Although the FCC said the Joint Cost Allocation rules were impor-
tant,94 it considered CEI/ONA to be the "focal point" of Computer
1II.91 The fundamental requirement of CEI is that a BOC that uses its
own basic services to provide an enhanced service must make those same
basic services available to its competitors. 96 Specifically, the basic serv-
ices provided by BOCs must meet several standards. The carrier must
provide standardized hardware and software specifications to its compet-
itors.97 It must maintain transmission quality similar to that which it
uses itself.98 Furthermore, installation, maintenence, and repair sched-
ules for its competitors' basic services facilities must be the same as the
schedules for the basic services the carrier uses for its own enhanced op-
erations.9 9 In addition, the final consumers must receive the same service
from either the carrier or a competitor."° ° Finally, a carrier making a
new enhanced offering must make the necessary basic services available
to its competitors at the same time. 101 The Commission required that a
CEI plan be submitted for each enhanced service offered by AT&T and
the BOCs.10 2
The Commission expected that the individual CEI plans eventually
would be replaced with ONA. In ONA, the network would be designed
so that all competitors would have equal access without the need for con-
stant, service-by-service monitoring." 3 After reviewing several BOCS'
efforts to develop ONA plans, 1" the Commission decided not to impose
90 Id. at 1300, 62 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 6, at 171.
91 Id. at 1299.
92 Id. at 1318, 62 Rad. Reg. at 214.
93 Id. at 1299.
94 Computer II Order, 104 F.C.C.2d at 1070.
95 Id. at 1020.
96 Id. at 1036.
97 Id. at 1039.




102 Id. at 1063.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 1059-63.
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any particular ONA proposal on AT&T and the BOGs.105 Instead, the
FCC demanded that AT&T and the BOCs submit a reasonable ONA
plan by February 1, 1988,106 and it promised to remove the CEI filing
requirements upon approval of the plan.' 7 The Commission said that it
would refuse to consider a company's CEI plans if they were submitted
after February 1, 1988, unless the company submitted an ONA plan by
that date.108 Later, however, the FCC relaxed this time requirement.109
In the Computer III Reconsideration Order, AT&T would argue
that it was unfair to impose CEI/ONA requirements on it since AT&T
no longer had any control over bottleneck facilities. l° Although the
Commission found that AT&T's argument had some merit, the Commis-
sion also found that it was necessary to maintain some ONA require-
ments on AT&T because of its strong position in the market for long
distance basic services.' As a result, the Commission partially relaxed
the unbundling requirements it placed on AT&T.' 12 However, AT&T
was still required to file a "modified ONA" plan by February 1, 1988,113
and comply with the service specific CEI requirements of the Computer
III Order. "' In another ruling published the same day, the Computer
II, Phase 11, Order, the FCC further modified the CEI/ONA require-
ments as they applied to protocol conversions, and restored the guide-
lines the FCC established in the Asynchronous/X.25 Waiver Order.'15
D. Reestablishment of Rules Governing Bottleneck Facilities
After the Computer III Order, the BOCs petitioned Judge Greene to
105 Id. at 1064.
106 Id. at 1067. A "reasonable" ONA plan is one that meets all the CEI requirements for all
enhanced services, and offers basic services to enhanced service providers on an individualized, "un-
bundled" basis. Id. at 1064-66.
107 Id. at 1067.
108 Third Computer Inquiry, Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, 62 Rad.
Reg. 2d (P & F) 1594, 1 156 at 1647 (May 22, 1987)[hereinafter Computer I Reconsideration
Order].
109 The BOCs were allowed to submit ONA plans that did not include some services, then update
the plans in subsequent years. Furnishing of Enhanced Services and Customer-Premises Equipment
by Communications Common Carriers, 53 Fed. Reg. 8630, 8631 (1988).
11o Computer 1W1 Reconsideration Order, 62 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F), %q 32-33 at 1610.
111 Id. 45 at 1614.
112 Id.
113 In the modified ONA plan, AT&T would have to describe, (1) its capabilities available to
transport the basic service elememts of local exchange carriers, (2) its arrangements for providing
such transport in a nondiscriminatory manner, (3) its procedures for responding to requests of the
local exchange carriers for new forms of transport for other basic functions, and (4) its implementa-
tion of the CEI and other non-structural safeguards for its enhanced services. Id. at 1610.
114 Id.
115 Computer III Order, Phase I, 62 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1662, 1683, (Released May 22, 1987).
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remove the restrictions placed on the BOCs in the MFJ.116 Judge
Greene denied these petitions in the case of United States v. Western
Electric ("September 10 Decision").117 In the MFJ, Judge Greene said
that he would not remove the MFJ restriction unless the BOCs could
show that there was no substantial possibility that the BOCs could use
their monopoly power to impede competition in the markets they seek to
enter."11 Specifically, Judge Greene reaffirmed the restrictions against in-
terexchange services119 and manufacturing equipment. 120  The restric-
tions against the BOCs provision of information services also were
maintained, 121 but the BOCs were permitted to acquire the infrastructure
necessary for the transmission of information services generated by
others. 122 This was done to encourage the development of a "videotex"
industry similar to that which has developed in France.
123
The BOCs based part of their arguments for the removal of the MFJ
restrictions on the Computer III Order, since the BOCs believed that
CEI/ONA would prevent them from using their monopoly power to im-
pede competition. 124 The Court found that since ONA had not been
fully defined or tested, it would be impossible to rely on ONA to keep the
BOCs from using their monopoly power to impede competition. 12 5 The
Court also found that, since ONA did not address problems that may
arise with new technology, and since it seemed unlikely that the BOCs
116 United States v. Western Electric, 673 F. Supp. 525, 528 (D.D.C. 1987)[hereinafter September
10 Decision].
117 Id. at 535.
118 Id. at 532. See also MFJ, 552 F.Supp. at 195 n.267.
119 September 10 Decision, 673 F. Supp. at 552.
120 Id. at 562.
121 Id. at 567.
122 Id. at 597. Shortly after this decision, the BOCs entered into several agreements with infor-
mation service providers to take advantage of the removal of this restriction. Roberts, Baby Bells
and Data Services Are Seeking to Join Forces, Wall St. J., Nov. 30, 1987, at 6, col. 1.
123 A videotex service uses a packet-switched network and a very simple computer terminal
which enables consumers to access the network. Independent companies supply information to the
network, such as financial market news or teleshopping services, which consumers can access for a
monthly fee. September 10 Decision, 673 F. Supp. at 588-89.
Judge Greene developed guidelines for videotex infrastructure provision in United States v.
Western Electric, 1988-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 67,918 at 57,619 (D.D.C. 1988)[hereinafter March 7
Decision]. As part of the provision of videotex infrastructure, the BOCs were allowed to offer an
"electronic white pages," but not a "yellow pages" directory arranged by type of service. Id. at
57,628-29. The BOCs also could offer a "help" capability, and voice storage and electronic mail
services. Id. at 57,629. Finally, the BOCs were allowed to bill for information srvice providers on
local telephone bills. Id. at 57,629-30.
124 September 10 Decision, 673 F. Supp. at 575.
125 Id. at 576-77. A prominent lawyer in the telecommunications field expects the BOCS to con-
trol bottlenecks effectively until at least the year 2020. Wenner, Phone Companies Ought to "Bun-
die", Wall St. J., Oct. 15, 1987, at 32, col. 3.
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could ever comply with the ONA requirements, it would be difficult to
rely on ONA to protect consumers.
126
The state of the regulatory treatment of enhanced services and CPE
in the United States today is that the controllers of bottleneck facilities
cannot provide long distance service or "information services." Nor can
they manufacture CPE. They may provide some enhanced services,
either on a separated basis or with an approved CEI plan.
III. DESCRIPTION OF THE GREEN PAPER
The Commission of the EEC published the Green Paper127 because
it saw the unification and modernization of European telecommunica-
tions as fundamental to the continued health of the entire European
economy. 128 The Green Paper does not carry the same weight in Europe
as an FCC order would in the United States. In the United States, the
FCC has been empowered by Congress to "execute and enforce" rules
governing the telecommunications industry. 129 Because of this, an FCC
order carries the force of law in the United States. The authority of the
Commission of the European Community is limited to developing poli-
cies and attempting to persuade individual Member States to adopt
them."30 Therefore, the Green Paper is more like a set of guidelines for
telecommunications regulation than an administrative ruling. Nonethe-
less, the Green Paper may represent the structure of future European
telecommunications regulations. The EEC would like its Member States
to adopt the Green Paper proposals by 1992.131
In Common Market countries, telecommunications services are usu-
ally provided by national Ministries of Posts, Telegraphy, and Telephony
("PTTs"). 132 Most PTTs are government owned monopolies, which con-
trol and operate the telecommunications network, i.e. the bottleneck fa-
126 September 10 Decision, 673 F. Supp. at 576 n.232, 577, 579. Later, Judge Greene would
accuse the FCC of "exhorting" the BOCs to ignore the MFJ. See United States v. Western Electric,
675 F. Supp. 655, 660-61 (D.D.C. 1987); Davis, AT&T Case Judge Berates Regulators, Reaffirms
Manufacturing Ban on Bells, Wall St. J., Dec. 4, 1987, at 2, col. 3.
127 Green Paper, supra note 2.
128 Id. at 18.
129 Wire or Radio Communication Act, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1934).
130 Hengig, The European Community's Bicephalous Political Authority: Council of Ministers-
Commission Relations, in INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 12 (J.
Lodge ed. 1983).
131 Green Paper, supra note 2, at Forward opposite 1. The EEC has scheduled the removal of
trade barriers in several other areas by 1992. See Tully, Europe Gets Ready for 1992, FORTUNE, Feb.
1, 1988, at 81.
132 In this paper, "PTT" will be used as an abbreviation of "Ministry of Posts, Telegraphy, and





cilities, in their countries. Many PTTs at this time also provided long
distance service. The EEC said it was important that the "integrity of
the network infrastructure" be maintained.'33 The EEC wanted to en-
sure that the financial viability of the PTTs would not be damaged by the
adoption of any of its proposals. 3 4 Therefore, the EEC proposed that
the PTTs exclusively continue to provide the network infrastructure.135
The EEC argued that it should not allow competition in long distance
telephone service, as was done in the United States, because the twelve
EEC Member States are not nearly as coordinated as the networks of the
seven Regional Holding Companies in the United States, even after the
MFJ.136 The EEC feared that forcing a breakup of the PTTs would only
fragment their networks further.137 The result of this decision is that,
under the Green Paper proposals, the owners of bottleneck facilities
would be allowed to provide enhanced services.
In order to protect the profitability of the PTTs, the Green Paper
proposed to allow some cross-subsidization.138 The EEC said that cross-
subsidization is permissible in general, but becomes unacceptable when
used as a means to engage in predatory pricing.139 The EEC called for
"transparency," or accounting and reporting requirements that force the
PTTs to reveal what profits are being used to set off losses in other sec-
tors.1" This would not really prevent predatory pricing. It would
merely force the Member States to tell each other when and to what
extent they are engaging in predatory pricing. The Green Paper did not
specify how much cross-subsidization would be allowed, or what form
the accounting and reporting requirements would take.14'
One of the ways the Green Paper proposed to introduce competition
into the European enhanced services market 42 while maintaining the fi-
nancial health of the PTTs was to stop distinguishing between basic serv-
133 Green Paper, supra note 2, at 72. Green Paper on the Development of the Common Market for
Telecommunications Services and Equipment, COM(87) 290 final (Brussels, Supp. June 30, 1987) at
130 [hereinafter Green Paper Supplement].
134 Green Paper, supra note 2, at 74.
135 Id. at 72.
136 Id. at 71-72.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 77.
139 Id.
140 Id. The European usage of the term "transparency" should not be confused with the usage of
that term in the United States. In the United States, "transparency" means that a message transmit-
ted through the telecommunications network is not altered by that transmission. Third Computer
Inquiry, Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Rad. Reg. (P&F), Current Service, 79:355,
at 79:363 n.30 (May 15, 1986)(hereinafter Computer III Notice, Phase I1).
141 Computer II Notice, Phase II, id.
142 The Green Paper referred to enhanced services as "value-added" services. Green Paper, supra
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ices and enhanced services. Instead, the Green Paper proposed to
distinguish between "reserved" services and "competitive" services.' 43
Reserved services would be services that are reserved for exclusive provi-
sion by the PTTs, and competitive services would be all other services. 44
The EEC felt that reserved services should be roughly the same as basic
services, but should be limited to the lowest number of services that will
ensure the financial viability of the PTTs.145 The Green Paper recom-
mended that reserved services be limited to voice telephony. 146
In addition to these proposals, the Green Paper specified three
changes as essential to the establishment of a competitive common mar-
ket in telecommunications: 147
1) the PTTs must give up exclusive provision of terminal equipment;
2) they must interconnect with and provide access for trans-border service
providers; and
3) the Government-owned PTTs must separate their regulatory from
their operational functions.
A. Terminal Equipment
The Green Paper said that the PTTs must allow other companies to
provide terminal equipment to its customers, in order to promote compe-
tition in this market.148 The move towards a competitive market has
been accelerated by agreements on standardized specifications and inter-
faces.' 49 Since then, the EEC has issued a Directive demanding that
PTTs abandon their monopoly control of the terminal equipment mar-
kets in their countries. 5 ° The Green Paper advocated an agreement re-
quiring PTTs to open at least 10% of their equipment supply contracts to
bids from companies in other Member States.''
note 2, at 35. However, in this Comment, they will be called "enhanced" services in order to be
consistent.
143 Id. at 65.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 66.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 73-74.
148 Id. at 61.
149 Id. at 62. See also Council Directive 86/361/EEC, Council Decision 87/95/EEC, and Coun-
cil Recommendation 86/659/EEC.
150 Commission Directive of May 16, 1988, on competition in the markets in telecommunications
terminal equipment, 88/301/EEC, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 131) 73, 4 Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 10,988.
151 Green Paper, supra note 2, at 62. See also Council Recommendation 84/550/EEC, 27 O.J.




Trans-border access for enhanced services is desirable, because it en-
ables the consumer to choose from a wide variety of enhanced services
providers and it increases the likelihood that the consumer will find the
services he wants. In addition, as the EEC pointed out, Article 59 of the
Treaty of Rome guarantees trans-border access.152 Therefore, the Com-
munity has a way to abolish the restrictions a Member State might put
on access to consumers.
153
Article 59 is subject to exceptions, and basic services would fall
under one of those exceptions. 154 The EEC suggested that reserved serv-
ices be defined narrowly, and that the definition be made similar among
Member States, in order to reduce the possibility of conflict among Mem-
ber States.' 55 In fact, the EEC suggested that reserved services be re-
stricted to voice services.1
5 6
The Green Paper also called for Community Directives to establish
guidelines for what the EEC called "Open Network Provision"
("ONP").5 7 Vague ONP guidelines, such as standardized interfaces,
limited number of reserved services, and some form of unbundling, were
included in the Green Paper.'58
In summary, if the Green Paper proposals are adopted, the control-
lers of the bottleneck facilities, the PTTs, would be allowed to participate
in any telecommunications or enhanced services market on an un-
separated basis, subject to requirements of transparency. The PTTs
would be expected to work together to try to develop an ONP plan.
C. Separating Regulatory and Operational Function
The Green Paper did not make any specific recommendations in this
area. The method of separating the PTTs' regulatory and operational
functions was left to the Member States. The method chosen in Great
Britain was to privatize its basic services provider and establish a new
government agency to regulate it.' 59 Denmark has retained government
ownership of its basic services provider, but created a separate agency to
regulate it."6  Belgium, 16 1 the Netherlands, 162 and Portugal, 1 63 were at
152 Green Paper, supra note 2, at 68.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 68-69.
155 Id. at 69.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 70.
159 Green Paper Supplement, supra note 133.
160 Id. at 9.
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the time of the Green Paper considering proposals similar to that adopted
in Denmark. It is difficult to predict what method will be adopted in the
other Member States.
IV. DESCRIPTION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATIONS IN THE
MEMBER STATES PRIOR TO THE GREEN PAPER
In May 1988, the EEC issued a Commission Directive demanding
that the Member States open their terminal equipment markets to com-
petition.164 The directive marks a first step towards one of the Green
Paper recommendations. The EEC, however, has yet to make progress
in the areas of trans-border access, and separation of regulatory and op-
erational functions. The Green Paper will lose its importance as an indi-
cation of the future structure of European telecommunications regulation
if no Member State adopts its recommendations. To assess which Mem-
ber States are likely to adopt these recommendations, it is necessary to
examine the regulatory treatment of enhanced services and CPE in the
Member States prior to the Green Paper. Recent changes in regulatory
treatment in each Member State also provide a basis for estimating the
probability of whether that Country will adopt the Green Paper recom-
mendations by the EEC's self imposed 1992 deadline.
This section mainly focuses on West Germany, France, and Great
Britain, because they are the three largest Member States,165 and because
they represent a good cross-section of Nations in terms of adopting Green
Paper proposals. The analysis reveals that West Germany will probably
adopt few if any proposals. France has adopted some of the proposals
that are in the Green Paper, and is likely to adopt more. Finally, Great
Britain's regulations already comply with the Green Paper.
161 Id. at 5.
162 Id. at 38-39.
163 Id. at 47.
164 Commission Directive of May 16, 1988, on competition in the markets in telecommunications
terminal equipment, 88/301/EEC, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 131) 73, 4 Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 10,988 (1988).
165 The 1984 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of West Germany (in 1984 dollars U.S.) was ap-
proximately $616 billion. The 1984 GDP of France was $491 billion, and the 1984 GDP of Great
Britain was $425 billion. The next largest GDP was that of Italy, with $351 billion. (Figures taken
from U.N. DEP'T OF INT'L ECONOMIC & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, STATISTICAL Y.B., 1983/84, at 95-99,
U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/STAT/SER.S /10, U.N. Sales No. E/F .85XVII.1. Exchange rates for 1984
taken from COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 373
(1986).)
West Germany, France, and Great Britain also control the three largest telecommunications
networks in the Common Market. West Germany has about 37.9 million telephones connected to its
system, France has about 34.3 million telephones, and Great Britain has about 31.7 million. Green





In Germany, both the postal and telecommunications services are
provided by Deutsche Bundespost ("DBP") 1 66 Telecommunications are
regulated by the Administrative Council, made up of the Minister of
Posts and Telecommunications, members of the Bundestag and
Bundesrat, and communications and finance experts. 167 Since the Minis-
ter of Posts and Telecommunications is also the head of the DBP, the
DBP is responsible for both the regulation and the operation of the tele-
communications system. 68 The Basic Law, Articles 73 and 87, forbids
the German Government from withdrawing from any telecommunica-
tions area, but the Basic Law does not forbid private companies from
entering these areas if the DBP permits them to.169 Other than the Basic
Law, the DBP does not operate under any statutory guidelines. 70
Competition in services is unlikely in the near future.1 71 The DBP is
required to provide universal service, and it is required to make a profit.
These requirements have resulted in a system in which long distance ser-
vice subsidizes local phone service, postal service, and the Federal
Budget.1 72 In spite of the fact that this tariff system is tremendously
wasteful, and forces long distance consumers to suffer most of the costs,
it probably will not be changed for political reasons. Any increase in
local tariffs which are offset by decreases in long distance tariffs would be
seen as a regressive transfer of wealth from poor home owners and apart-
ment dwellers to rich businessmen.1 73 The German public fears that an
introduction of competition in services would destroy this cross-subsidi-
zation arrangement.1 74
Competition in equipment is allowed. 175 In fact, IBM recently en-
tered into an arrangement with Siemens, A.G., a West German equip-
ment manufacturer, to manufacture compatible equipment.1 76  The
166 Green Paper Supplement, supra note 133, at 16.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 19, GRUNDGESETZ [GG] arts. 73(7), 87.
170 M. SNOW, TELECOMMUNICATIONS: REGULATION AND DEREGULATION IN INDUSTRIAL-
IZED DEMOCRACIES 145 (1986).
171 Id. at 141.
172 Id. at 145.
173 Id. at 145-46.
174 Id. at 140. In August, 1987, a West German commission made up of representatives from
telecommunications trade unions, industry, and the government proposed separating postal services
from other telecommunications services. Even this weak first step towards the Green Paper goals
met with fierce domestic opposition. Pope, Report on German Telecommunications Is Unlikely to
Satisfy Trade Partners, Wall St. J., Aug. 19, 1987, at 19, col. 2.
175 M. SNOW, supra note 170, at 141-42.
176 Wall St. J., Oct. 22, 1987, at 16, col. 4.
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extent to which competition is allowed varies for each type of equipment,
and depends on a case-by-case political determination. Some people
want to exclude the DBP from almost all terminal equipment markets to
allow other companies to establish themselves, and other people want to
allow the DBP to participate in any market in which it can achieve econ-
omies of scope. 77 Therefore, whether or not competition will develop in
equipment depends on West Germany's political future.
In summary, West Germany's equipment market may become com-
petitive, but the popularity of its cross-subsidization scheme will proba-
bly prevent any competition in enhanced services. In addition, the Basic
Law prohibition against the DBP leaving the telecommunications indus-
try makes the separation of regulatory and operational functions un-
likely.1 78 As a result, it seems doubtful that Germany will adopt the
Green Paper proposals by 1992.
B. France
In France, the common carrier branch of the PTT is the Direction
G~n6ral des T616communications ("DGT"). 7 9 The DGT has set up
Compagnie G6n6ral des Communications ("COGECOM") as a holding
company for all its subsidiaries. I8 0 Among these subsidiaries are Trans-
pac, a company that operates and markets a packet-switched data net-
work, and T616syst~mes, a computer services and software company.181
The DGT uses its Transpac network to provide videotex service under
the name of the "T61&el" system.
18 2
DGT manufactures none of its own equipment. Instead, it procures
equipment from the private sector through general procurement proce-
dures. s18  DGT installs equipment, but also authorizes private firms to
install equipment if they meet certain standards. It also subcontracts
some of its own installation work out.18 4 Therefore, even though the
French equipment market appears to be rigidly controlled by the Gov-
ernment, several companies actually compete in the market.1 8 5
The official Government monopoly in services ended in October
177 M. SNOW, supra note 170, at 141-42.
178 In principle, there is no reason why these functions could not be split into two separate gov-
ernment agencies, but in practice it seems redundant to regulate a government-owned corporation.
M. SNOW, supra note 170, at 137.
179 Green Paper Supplement, supra note 133, at 11.
180 Id. at 15.
181 M. SNOW, supra note 170, at 108.
182 September 10 Decision, 673 F. Supp. at 588.
183 M. SNOW, supra note 170, at 109.
184 Id. at 110-11.
185 There has been competition in the French equipment market since the 1920s. Id. at 114.
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1987.186 Some French companies offered services before October, even
though they were illegal at that time. 18 7 At the present, there are no
plans to separate the regulatory and operational functions of the DGT.
France, however, appears well on its way to meeting the standards set in
the Green Paper.
C. United Kingdom
In 1981, Great Britain started to denationalize its telecommunica-
tions system, British Telecom. The British Government now owns 49%
of British Telecom stock, and the other 51% is held by private inves-
tors.188 Since 1981, a regulatory body, the Office of Telecommunications
("OFTEL"), was established to license carriers and regulate prices. 18 9 A
competing carrier, Mercury Communications Limited, has been allowed
to enter the British local network market, but OFTEL has announced
that it will not license any other carriers for this market until 1990. Mer-
cury is completely privately owned. 190
Great Britain has introduced competition to both its services and
equipment markets. Basic services are provided by British Telecom and
Mercury. 19t OFTEL limits British Telecom's price increases in basic
services to the Retail Price Index minus three percent ("RPI-3").
192
British Telecom may also provide enhanced services in competition with
Mercury or any other company having a license from OFTEL allowing it
to lease lines from either British Telecom or Mercury. 193 Almost all
CPE may be purchased either from British Telecom or private
suppliers. 194
Given the extensive liberalization of the equipment and the services
markets, and the privatization of British Telecom, Great Britain might
186 Browning, France Intends to Curb IBM in New Market, Wall St. J., Sept. 23, 1987, at 26, col.
5.
187 Id.
188 Green Paper Supplement, supra note 133, at 49.
189 M. SNow, supra note 170, at 157.
190 Green Paper Supplement, supra note 133, at 49.
191 Id. at 50.
192 Id. at 51-52. M. SNow, supra note 170, at 159-60. The FCC recently proposed applying price
cap regulation similar to OFTEL's system to AT&T. Price caps are popular among telecommunica-
tions scholars, because they do not offer the same incentives for cross-subsidization as rate-of-return
regulation. Bhattacharyya and Laughhunn, Price Cap Regulation: Can We Learn From the British
Experience?, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Oct. 15, 1987, at 22. However, this proposal has met with resist-
ance from Congress. FCC Proposal for Phone Deregulation is in Trouble, Wall. St. J., Feb. 12, 1988,
at 4, col. I.
193 M. SNOW, supra note 170, at 159-60.
194 At the moment, British Telecom still maintains a monopoly in payphones, but all other equip-
ment is subject to competition. Green Paper Supplement, supra note 133, at 57.
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meet the Green Paper standards today, and probably will meet them by
1992.
D. Other Member States
Most of the other Member States are likely to adopt the Green Paper
proposals by 1992. Belgium' 95 and the Netherlands 96 have appointed
committees to study the organization of their telecommunications sys-
tems. In both countries the committees have suggested reforms similar
to those called for in the Green Paper. Before the publishing of the Green
Paper, the legislatures of Denmark197 and Ireland19 had passed new tele-
communications regulations which conformed to the Green Paper recom-
mendations. Luxembourg, 199 Portugal,2 '0 Italy,20 1 and Spain2"2 were
considering new telecommunications legislation when Green Paper was
published. The EEC expects this new legislation to adopt most recom-
mendations called for in the Green Paper. In addition, the Spanish tele-
phone monopoly, Telef6nica, has opened its equipment industry to
foreign participation by entering a joint venture with AT&T,20 3 and a
company owned by Siemens, A.G. and GTE has started to provide pub-
lic switching services in Italy and Belgium.204
Currently, Greece is rebuilding and modernizing its existing tele-
communications infrastructure.20 5 It has no plans to change its regula-
tory system.20 6 Nevertheless, all the Member States except Greece and
West Germany are likely to adopt all or most of the Green Paper recom-
195 Id. at 1-5.
196 Id. at 35-40.
197 Id. at 6-10.
198 Id. at 25-27.
199 Id. at 33-34.
200 Id. at 45-48.
201 Id. at 28-32.
202 Id. at 41-44.
203 Hudson, A T&TIs Seen Entering Spain In Joint Venture, Wall St. J., Oct. 20, 1987, at 33, col.
4.
204 New Company To Oversee Joint Venture with GTE, Wall St. J., Jan. 6, 1988, at 8, col. 4.
205 Green Paper Supplement, supra note 133, at 23-24.
206 Id. at 24. However, the EEC has recently agreed to grant Greece funds under the STAR
program, which is designed to improve the telecommunications network in the more remote regions
of the Community. Commission Decision 88/55/EEC, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 30) 33 (1988).
Similar grants were given to Spain, Commission Decision 88/56/EEC; France, 88/57/EEC; Ireland,
88/58/EEC; Italy, 88/59/EEC; Portugal, 88/60/EEC; and Great Britain, 88/61/EEC. 31 0.3.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 30) 34-39 (1988).
It is possible that this grant will enable Greece to consider reforming its regulatory system




mendations. The Green Paper, therefore, represents a fairly accurate pic-
ture of the future structure of European telecommunications regulations.
V. COMPARISON OF THE FCC RULES TO THE GREEN PAPER
The regulatory approaches of the FCC in Computer III and the
EEC in the Green Paper are similar. Both schemes appreciate the bene-
fits of allowing common carriers to participate in CPE and enhanced
services markets. Both have rejected structural safeguards in favor of
accounting and reporting requirements, and both are working toward
some sort of ONA arrangement.
Some differences do exist. For example, the FCC continues to dis-
tinguish between basic and enhanced services based on the characteristics
of the services. The EEC distinguishes between basic and enhanced serv-
ices based on the nature of the markets for the services. The other major
difference is the degree to which the owners of bottleneck facilities are
allowed to provide enhanced services.
The EEC's method of distinguishing between basic and enhanced
services seems more practicable. The FCC's distinctions, no matter how
flexible, become outdated after five years of technological innovation. It
would seem better for the FCC, like the EEC, to decide whether to regu-
late those services based on how well market forces control the prices.
The FCC considered such a plan in Part II of the Computer III
Notice, but rejected it later because the Commission believed it was not
practicable. To rely on market forces to distinguish basic and enhanced
services was too ambiguous and ad hoc, and risked creating bureaucratic
impediments to innovation and progress. 07 The Commission noted that,
in order to distinguish between services that can be regulated by market
forces and services that cannot, workable definitions of concepts like
"dominant carrier", "competition", "bottleneck", and "market power"
would be necessary.208 The Commission then concluded that workable
definitions of these concepts were not possible.
The Part II Proposal was not as ambiguous or as ad hoc as the
Commission claimed it to be. Workable definitions of these concepts are
possible. In the early 1980s, the FCC developed a definition of "domi-
nant carrier" in its Competitive Common Carrier proceeding. 20 9 The pro-
ceeding was intended to identify the carriers with the greatest ability to
abuse their market position so that the FCC would be able to devote its
207 Computer III Order, 104 F.C.C. at 1017.
208 Id. at 1015.
209 85 F.C.C.2d 1 (1980).
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time and budget to enforcing regulations against only those carriers.2 1 °
The definition of "dominant carrier" developed in the Competitive Com-
mon Carrier proceeding would work to distinguish between regulated
and unregulated services. "Dominant carrier" was defined as a carrier
with "market power," which, in turn, was defined as the ability to con-
trol prices.21 1 These definitions are unambiguous and workable, and the
FCC should not need to develop new definitions of "dominant carrier"
or "market power."
"Bottleneck" also seems easy to define. The following definition
would suffice: "Any facility or piece of equipment through which all or
almost all messages sent through the Telecommunications Network must
be routed to reach any particular message receiver, or any facility or
piece of equipment that cannot be bypassed without great expense."
"Competition" would be difficult to define, but a definition would
not be necessary for the Part II proposal to work. Part II would only
require a determination of which services can be offered with either sub-
stantial economies of scale or scope. While economies of scale or scope
can be very difficult to quantify, it should not be difficult to determine
whether or not substantial economies exist.
The FCC is correct in asserting that this market-based analysis
would have to be conducted on a case-by-case basis. The analysis, how-
ever, would not need to be a "fairly complex economic analysis on a
service-by-service, market-by-market, and carrier-by-carrier basis.
212
The "dominant carrier" determination already would have been made,
and the "bottleneck" and "economies of scale" determinations would re-
quire little administrative delay or expense. The administrative delay
and expense would seem minor compared to the review required of a
CEI plan submitted by AT&T or a BOC.213 "[G]iven the difficulties in
the Commission's multi-year task of forging cost-based local exchange
access charges in order to achieve parity between AT&T and other inter-
exchange carriers vis-a-vis unaffiliated local telephone companies, imple-
menting CEI/ONA will constitute an even more burdensome
endeavor.
2 14
The other major difference between Computer III and the Green Pa-
per is the degree to which the operators of bottleneck facilities would be
allowed to provide enhanced services. In the United States, the BOCs
210 Id. at 4.
211 Id. at 30.
212 Computer III Order, 104 F.C.C.2d at 1015.
213 See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.





are not allowed to provide any data processing services, and may provide
only some enhanced services, either on a separated basis or with an ap-
proved CEI plan.215 In Europe, the PTTs will be allowed to provide any
"competitive service," i.e., any data processing or enhanced service.216
The EEC gave them broad power in hopes of integrating telecom-
munications systems across national boundaries.217 At the moment, the
system is fragmented among the twelve Member States, and the EEC
feared that creating any separation requirements would further fragment
the system.
2 18
By preserving what little integration exists, the EEC has erected a
tremendous obstacle to further integration. The PTTs, because of their
control of bottlenecks, will continue to engage in discriminatory behavior
by denying other carriers access to consumers. By allowing the PTTs to
compete with these carriers for these consumers, the EEC has given the
PTTs a strong incentive to engage in this discriminatory behavior. This
discriminatory behavior will severely limit trans-border integration.
The EEC probably was aware of the danger of discriminatory be-
havior occurring, but it may have assumed that a good ONP plan would
prevent discriminatory behavior. One could argue that the EEC should
not have made such an assumption. Whether its assumption was reason-
able depends on what the EEC had in mind when discussing the develop-
ment of ONP. If the EEC meant something similar to the FCC's
conception of ONA, that the local networks be redesigned so that there is
a built-in equal access, 219 then the assumption was not unreasonable.
However, there is no guarantee that an ONA plan will ever be developed,
or that if it is, how long it will take. Given this uncertainty, it seems
unreasonable for the EEC to assume that consumers and competitors
will be adequately protected by an ONA plan against discriminatory
behavior.22
If the EEC meant something similar to the FCC's conception of
CEI, then it may be reasonable to assume that ONP would prevent dis-
criminatory behavior, but it is also likely that the consumers would not
benefit from it. As Frieden points out, the FCC never determined the
actual costs and benefits of CEI. Frieden also discusses the possibility of
215 Which enhanced services are allowed depends on the definition of "information services." See
supra note 58 and accompanying text.
216 See supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
217 Green Paper, supra note 2, at 73-74.
218 Id. at 71-72.
219 Computer III Order, 104 F.C.C.2d at 1063.
220 Frieden, supra note 214, at 392.
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a long, complicated proceeding to determine the specifics of CEI.221 Fur-
thermore, CEI requires extensive filing and reporting.222 At least some
of the expenses will be borne by the consumer, and they tend to counter-
act any savings that would result through achieving economies of scale or
scope.223 Therefore, it is possible that a CEI-type plan would ensure
equal access, but that the savings would be swallowed up by administra-
tive expenses rather than be passed on to the consumer.
As a result, under the Green Paper proposals, no one can be certain
whether ONP will enable trans-border integration to take place, how
long the process will take, or whether, if trans-border integration occurs,
the consumer would receive as much benefit from it as he should. On the
other hand, if each PTT was split into two entities, one to operate the
bottleneck facilities and the other to provide long distance and enhanced
services, then the bottleneck operator would have little incentive to en-
gage in discriminatory behavior. Trans-border integration, therefore,
could take place more quickly and with little administrative expense.
In summary, the FCC would be more likely to achieve its goal of
reducing regulatory uncertainty surrounding the introduction of new en-
hanced services if it adopted the market-based definition of basic and
enhanced services which will be used in Europe. In addition, the EEC
would be more likely to achieve its goal of integrating its telecommunica-
tions systems across national boundaries if it prohibited the owners of
bottleneck facilities from providing enhanced services as is currently
done in the United States.
VI. CONCLUSION
The problems presented in determining the proper regulatory treat-
ment of enhanced services and CPE are difficult. The FCC and the EEC
have arrived at similar solutions for many, but not all, of these problems.
The FCC would be more likely to achieve its goal of removing bureau-
cratic impediments to innovation and progress22 4 if it were to adopt a
market based definition of enhanced services, similar to that proposed in
the Green Paper and Part II of the Computer III Notice.225 The EEC
would be more likely to achieve its goal of integrating the European tele-
communications market across national boundaries if it were to break up
its PTTs into long distance and enhanced services providers and bottle-
221 id. at 391-92.
222 Computer I Order, 104 F.C.C.2d at 1055-56.
223 Competative Common Carrier Proceeding, 85 F.C.C.2d at 5.
224 Computer II Order, 104 F.C.C.2d at 985.
225 Green Paper, supra note 2, at 65; Computer III Notice, 50 Fed. Reg. 33,581, 33,589-91.
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neck facilities operators, similar to what the United States did in the
MFJ.
The September 10 Decision, retained most of the restrictions placed
on the owners of bottleneck facilities. The Court, however, did allow the
owners of bottleneck facilities to provide protocol conversion services
and the infrastructure necessary for videotex. Since these services seem
to have natural monopoly characteristics,2 6 it is appropriate that the
owners of bottleneck facilities are allowed to provide these services. If
the FCC allows the owners of bottleneck facilities to offer other enhanced
services, then the treatment of bottleneck operators in the United States
will begin to resemble the treatment of European bottleneck operators.
Consumers in the United States will risk suffering from the discrimina-
tory behavior of the BOCs in the exchange for a low probability of re-
duced prices or improved service.
Steven M. Spaeth
226 In the September 10 Decision, Judge Greene wrote that "the broad scale and the reasonable
cost criteria necessary for a successful system can be met only by permitting the Regional Companies
to provide the necessary infrastructure components for efficient videotex services . September
10 Decision, 673 F. Supp. at 591.
